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ABSTRACT
A distinctive feature of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is cognitive
defusion. Rapid word repetition is one of the exercises used in ACT to promote defusion.
Previous research has examined the effect of this exercise with the general population, using
words representing negative self-referential thoughts. Studies have found that discomfort and
believability of these thoughts decrease more following this defusion exercise as compared to a
thought distraction task.
The present study evaluated the effects of the word repetition defusion exercise using
content reflecting academic distress, in an undergraduate sample primed to feel academic
anxiety. The defusion exercise was compared to a thought control task and a control condition
(reading). The statement “I am a failure” was rated for discomfort, believability, and willingness
pre- and post-intervention.
There was no statistically significant difference between the defusion and thought control
interventions in changing any of the ratings. However, some statistically significant differences
were found between the interventions and the control condition (reading an article). Defusion
was superior to the control condition in decreasing discomfort ratings. Thought control was
superior to the control condition in decreasing believability ratings. Willingness ratings
decreased significantly in the thought control condition relative to the control condition.
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was used as a behavioral measure
to gauge any changes in psychological flexibility. The IRAP compared latency of correct
ii

responses to tasks consistent and inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about
academics. No statistically significant effect was found between conditions for the IRAP,
indicating no difference in effect on psychological flexibility.
Differences in the outcome of this study and previous studies are discussed. Future
studies should examine the word repetition and other cognitive defusion techniques in specific
clinical populations. Future research should work toward refining measures of defusion.
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I. COGNITIVE DEFUSION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY WITH SELF
RELEVANT ACADEMIC DISTRESS STIMULI

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a mindfulness-based intervention, one of
the contextualistic approaches that constitute the third generation of behavior therapy. ACT
posits that problems in contextual control over cognitive processes can cause or worsen
psychological dysfunction. These problems result in psychological inflexibility, where private
events (e.g., thoughts, emotions, sensations) function to inhibit behaviors which would further an
individual’s chosen values and goals. ACT aims to create contexts in which behavior is more
sensitive to environmental contingencies germane to values and goals and less sensitive to the
form or frequency of private events. ACT does this through behavior change techniques and
through mindfulness and acceptance techniques. (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Hayes,
Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006)
Reviews of ACT outcomes support its efficacy and have shown nearly identical overall
effect sizes (Hayes, et al., 2006; Ost, 2008; Powers, Zum Vorde Sive Vording, & Emmelkamp,
2009; Ruiz, 2010). The most recent meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials of ACT, with
18 studies in the analysis, found an effect size of 0.68 (Hedge’s g) compared to wait list and
psychological placebos, 0.42 compared with treatment as usual, and equivalent effects when
compared with established treatments (e.g., cognitive behavior therapy, cognitive therapy,
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systematic desensitization) (Powers, et al., 2009). However, a reanalysis of the data yielded a
significant effect even compared to established treatments, with an effect size of 0.27 (Levin &
Hayes, 2009). A recent broad review of all empirical evidence for ACT notes its efficacy and
generally large effect sizes (Ruiz, 2010). All authors conclude that further studies are needed to
fully determine any advantage of ACT over traditional treatments or vice versa, as ACT is still a
relatively new intervention.

Need to Examine Mediators and Mechanisms of Change
Kazdin (2007) argues that a large problem in psychotherapy research is the lack of
evidence that interventions work through their hypothesized mechanisms, despite years of
empirical support of the symptom change produced by standard interventions. He illustrates the
methodological problem of establishing a timeline of cause and effect between mediator and
symptom change with examples from research on cognitive therapy. Though change in
cognitive content has long been presumed as a mechanism in cognitive therapy, this is not
supported empirically. Existing evidence actually suggests that cognitions are not a mediator or
mechanism of cognitive therapy. (Kazdin, 2007)
A well-designed study sensitive to these methodological issues found that changes in
negative cognitive content did not precede or predict changes in depressive symptoms (Jarrett,
Vittengl, Doyle, & Clark, 2007). In a series of studies examining the components of cognitive
behavioral therapy, no added benefit was found from cognitive interventions, leaving only
behavioral activation components (Jacobson et al., 1996; Gortner, Gollan, Dobson, & Jacobson,
1998). In a study examining moderate and severe levels of depression, individuals showed
poorer outcomes in a cognitive therapy condition compared to behavioral activation (Dimidjian
2

et al., 2006). Findings in these studies are not anomalies. Although cognitive behavioral
interventions have an unquestionably substantial evidence for treatment outcome, confirmation
of treatment processes has been elusive. Longmore and Worrell (2007), in a review of the
literature on cognitive behavior therapy, found no substantial support for cognitive change as a
mediator of treatment outcome. In addition, they noted that component studies have consistently
shown no increase in efficacy due to cognitive interventions.
In light of years of training these interventions to thousands of clinicians, it would seem
wise to explore mediators and mechanisms of action in ACT sooner rather than later. The
development and application of the therapy could then evolve based on empirical findings. This
can be accomplished from a bottom-up approach, without waiting for large dismantling studies,
through methods such as testing individual components, processes, or even specific techniques
(Hinton & Gaynor, 2010). Hayes (2008) emphasizes that attention to mediation has been part of
the development of ACT since its inception. Kazdin likens the search for mediators, and
ultimately mechanisms of change, to the strategy of chess, which is “won on multiple fronts,”
through “an integrated series of actions, and converging moves” (2007, p. 11).
One method of progressing with this bottom-up approach is to investigate processes or
components unique to ACT. Compared with traditional cognitive behavior therapy, one of
ACT’s most distinguishing features is cognitive defusion. Defusion is the process that directly
ties ACT to the behavior analysis of language in Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, BarnesHolmes, & Roche, 2001). If ACT is to differentiate itself from other cognitive behavior
therapies and to maintain theoretical coherence, then cognitive defusion should be closely
examined.
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Cognitive Defusion
ACT identifies fusion as a potentially problematic process resulting from normal human
verbal learning. Fusion occurs when “certain verbal functions of events exert strong stimulus
control over responding to the exclusion of other directly and indirectly available psychological
functions” (Wilson & DuFrene, 2008, p. 54). Problematic fusion often involves aversive
functions of language or thoughts. This causes difficulty when responding is very sensitive to
those aversive functions that result in neglect or avoidance of valued activity. Other functions of
thoughts might be available but are weaker. This is sometimes conceived as a restriction of
probable responses to verbal stimuli, producing a narrow repertoire of responding. These narrow
repertoires are of concern when they impede psychologically healthy behavior or induce
psychologically destructive behavior. (Wilson & DuFrene, 2008; Wilson & Murrell, 2004)
Fusion often takes the form of responding to thoughts as if their content were literally
true (Hayes et al., 2006). This can promote avoidance of desired activity or encourage undesired
behaviors. Examples of fusion abound. An example relevant to the undergraduate sample in our
study might be a thought like “I’m not smart enough for this class.” In fusion, this thought might
function to inhibit studying, asking questions in class, going to class, or getting help from the
professor. Someone with depression might have the thought “I don’t have enough energy to go
out,” and respond to it by avoiding activity. Someone with trichotillomania might have the
thought “I can’t stand this urge, I’ll pull just one more hair,” and respond to it by pulling out his
or her hair.
Cognitive defusion is the process of lessening the strong, inflexible verbal stimulus
control of fusion. Cognitive defusion techniques create contexts in which behavior becomes less
sensitive to the content of thoughts, which have previously functioned to encourage avoidance
4

and inhibit valued action (Hayes et al., 2006; Blackledge, 2007). Sometimes this is described as
changing how “one interacts with or relates to thoughts” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 8). Defusion has
also been described as broadening repertoires in response to thoughts (Wilson & DuFrene,
2008). In this sense, any exercise that involves new ways of experiencing or responding to
thoughts enhances defusion.
Defusion techniques often attempt to disrupt what is referred to as the context of
literality. This is the context of our verbal culture which functions to encourage an experience of
thought content as literally true. Our verbal culture encourages responding to thoughts as if they
are literally true in various ways. One way is the culture’s focus on thought content rather than
on the process of thinking. Conventional speech patterns also help us to think literally about
thoughts. Speaking at a consistent and culturally determined pace, for example, allows us to
focus on the meaning of words rather than their sounds (Hayes et al., 2006; Blackledge, 2007).
Many defusion exercises focus attention on the process of thinking, on noticing thoughts
as they occur. An example is observing thoughts in an eyes-closed exercise where the thoughts
are visualized on leaves floating down a stream. Labeling thoughts as thoughts (e.g., I am
having the thought that . . .) is another example. Defusion exercises that target conventional
speech patterns include repeating thought content over and over at a rapid pace, until the sounds
of the words become prominent and their literal meaning becomes less prominent. Manner of
speech can also be altered in a defusion exercise. Thoughts might be sung or said in a silly
voice, for example. While altering conventional speech patterns, these exercises also draw
attention to the process of thinking over literal content of thoughts. (Blackledge, 2007)
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Empirical Examinations of Defusion
Several studies have focused on defusion, including studies of defusion as a mediator of
outcome in a full ACT treatment package, as the sole component in a brief treatment, and finally,
examination of specific defusion techniques (Hesser, Westin, Hayes, & Anderson, 2009; Hinton
& Gaynor, 2010; Healy et al., 2008; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al.,
2009; Masuda et al., 2010). Findings of these studies are briefly described below.
Hesser and colleagues (2009) examined participants’ in-session defusion-consistent
statements during an ACT treatment for tinnitus distress. An instance of a defusion-consistent
statement was defined as “a verbal statement that included the client noticing, labeling and
separating self from a private experience (e.g., a thought, feeling)” (p. 525). Along with
frequency of defusion-consistent statements, raters gave each instance an “extensiveness” score,
indicating the strength or depth of the statement. A “peak” level score was assigned for each
session, being the highest “extensiveness” rating achieved during that session.
Results showed that frequency and peak level of defusion-consistent statements early in
treatment predicted long term outcome. Further, because outcome measures were taken
throughout the study, the experimenters were able to demonstrate that changes in defusion
occurred before improvements in outcomes. The experimenters conclude that this is preliminary
evidence for defusion as a mediator in ACT. (Hesser et al., 2009)
Cognitive defusion as the sole component of a brief treatment for distressed college
students was compared to a waitlist control condition (Hinton & Gaynor, 2010). Participants
were experiencing general psychological distress, as measured by scoring at least one SD above
the mean on the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) and one SD below the mean on the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). The treatment consisted of three weekly sessions, including a
6

defusion rationale and defusion techniques the experimenters refer to as vocalizing strategies.
These strategies included repeating negative self-referential thoughts aloud rapidly, saying them
slowly, saying them in a different voice, saying them like a radio announcer, and saying them
like brief stories—with various qualities such as boring or outrageous.
Results showed statistically significant effects on all outcome measures (BSI, RSES, and
the Beck Depression Inventory-II) in the cognitive defusion condition. Large effects sizes were
found for self-esteem, general psychological distress, and depressive symptoms. Similar results
were found for the waitlist participants once they received the defusion intervention.
The cognitive defusion condition produced a significant increase in psychological
flexibility, as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II). The
experimenters also constructed a subscale of the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory for use as a
process measure of defusion for each session. They note that these scores suggested a gradual
improvement in defusion over sessions. Outcome measures were not administered at each
session, so a timeline that could establish whether defusion preceded or followed change in
outcome was not produced. (Hinton & Gaynor, 2010)
Another study examined the effect of normal versus defused self-statements in a sample
of undergraduate students (Healy, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Keigh, Luciano, & Wilson,
2008). Negative self-statements were presented visually. The phrase “I am having the thought
that” was used in conjunction with self-statements to promote cognitive defusion. Examples of
normal and defused statements are “I am a bad person” and “I am having the thought that I am a
bad person,” respectively. Ten different negative self-statements were used. The statements
appeared on a computer screen for 6 seconds. Participants then rated discomfort, believability,
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and willingness with regard to the statements (i.e., willingness to read and think about the
statements).
Defused presentations elicited significantly lower discomfort ratings than normal
presentations of the negative thoughts. Defused presentations also elicited significantly higher
willingness ratings than normal presentations. Although higher ratings of believability were
found for defused presentations, this was explained as possibly an artifact of the wording. It was
hypothesized that participants were responding to whether or not it was believable that they were
“having the thought that . . .” rather than believability of the content of the negative selfstatement itself. The experimenters concluded that the results supported the use of cognitive
defusion in increasing willingness to experience disturbing cognitive content and in reducing the
discomfort of having the cognitive content. In an effort to examine demand characteristics,
subjects were told that the exercise would either work, would not work, or would have no effect
on the impact of the negative self statements. The impact of the defusion exercise was the same
regardless of what subjects were told about the impact of the exercise. (Healy et al., 2008)
Three studies investigated the effect of a specific cognitive defusion exercise used in
ACT that consists of rapidly repeating aloud a word or phrase, commonly known as the MilkMilk-Milk exercise (Hayes, et al., 1999, p. 154). The first was a time-series study (Masuda et
al., 2004). The repeated-word defusion exercise was alternated with a thought control task (deep
breathing and positive thinking) and a control task (reading). Brief rationales were included for
defusion and thought control conditions. Participants produced their own self-relevant negative
thoughts and reduced them to one word (e.g. “I am too fat;” “fat”). This word was repeated
aloud rapidly for 30 seconds during the exercise. Discomfort and believability of the thoughts
were rated on two visual analog scales pre- and post-intervention. The cognitive defusion
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exercise reduced ratings on both believability and discomfort of these negative thoughts as
compared to the other conditions. This finding held across all eight participants.
The second study explored the effect of different durations of the same repeated-word
exercise (Masuda et al., 2009). Participants again used one-word versions of their own selfrelevant negative thoughts. Statistically significant reductions in ratings of discomfort and
believability were found. The reductions were at their greatest after 3-10 seconds for discomfort
and 20-30 seconds for believability. The experimenters note that this suggests that discomfort
and believability are separate “functional aspects of cognitive events” (2009, p. 1).
The third study examined the same defusion exercise in a group design, comparing it
with a thought distraction exercise (Masuda et al., 2010). The thought distraction exercise
consisted of instructions to think of something else, prompted periodically by the experimenter
with statements such as “don’t think about it.” Both conditions included rationales. As in
previous studies, subjects generated their own self-relevant negative thoughts and reduced them
to one word. Discomfort and believability of these thoughts were rated pre- and postintervention. Defusion was found to reduce discomfort and believability ratings significantly
more than thought distraction. However, the thought distraction exercise did reduce discomfort
ratings significantly more than the control condition.
A subgroup with higher depressive symptoms was used for additional analyses.
Participants were undergraduate students and those with scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory-II at or above the mean of the sample were selected. For this subgroup, defusion was
not superior to thought distraction in reducing discomfort, but it was superior to the control
condition. There was also no statistically significant differential effect by condition on
believability ratings.
9

Aims of the Present Study
The empirical studies described above suggest that word repetition, as a specific defusion
technique, is effective in at least temporarily reducing discomfort and believability of selfrelevant negative thoughts in the general population. It also appears that defusion could be
superior to thought control interventions in reducing discomfort and believability. However,
when a subsample with depressive symptoms was analyzed, this effect appeared less robust.
Researchers have yet to examine this specific defusion technique in other populations, with
distinct psychological difficulties, or with particular problematic thought content.
The present study evaluated the effects of the word repetition defusion exercise using
content reflecting academic distress. Procedures were adapted from Masuda and colleagues
(2004). A defusion exercise was compared to a thought control exercise. A distraction task
(reading an article) was used as an experimental control condition. Participants were
undergraduate students who were primed to think about academic failure. “I am a failure” was
used as the thought content.
Based on previous research findings (Healy et al., 2008; Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et
al., 2009; Masuda et al., 2010), it was hypothesized that the cognitive defusion exercise would
result in a greater decrease in discomfort, a greater decrease in believability, and a greater
increase in willingness than the other conditions. In addition, a secondary hypothesis was that a
purported behavioral measure of psychological flexibility, the Implicit Relational Assessment
Procedure (IRAP), would indicate a greater increase in flexibility as a result of the defusion
exercise compared to the other conditions.
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II. METHOD

Pilot Study with IRAP Stimuli and Intervention Rationales
Participants. A separate sample of 104 undergraduate students was surveyed prior to the
main study. Plausibility of experimental rationales (cognitive defusion and thought control) was
evaluated. IRAP stimuli were also tested to ensure their desired function. These participants
were recruited from the psychology department subject pool. There were 63 female and 41 male
participants. Seventy-nine were Caucasian, 17 African-American, 4 Asian, 2 Hispanic, and 2
self-identified as “other.” The mean age of participants was 20 years old (range = 18-31).
Intervention Rationales. Participants were presented with the rationale of both the
cognitive defusion and the thought control interventions as ways to cope with the thought “I am a
failure.” Participants then filled out rating forms asking “How helpful will this exercise be to
cope with the difficult thought?” They rated both interventions from 1 (not helpful at all) to 7
(extremely helpful). Thought control (M = 5.17) received significantly higher ratings than
cognitive defusion (M = 3.78), t (103) = -6.372, p = .000. This indicates that participants
believed thought control would be more helpful than cognitive defusion. Participants were also
asked, “When you get these kinds of anxious thoughts about academics, which is closer to what
you normally do?” (cognitive defusion or thought control). Seventy-five percent responded that
thought control is closer to what they normally do. Participants were asked which intervention
11

they thought was a better idea and 74% responded that thought control was a better idea. These
results suggest that cognitive defusion had no advantage over thought control based on rationale
alone.

IRAP Stimuli. Potential stimuli for the IRAP included 39 positive and 49 negative
words related to academic performance (e.g., wise, studious, stupid, feebleminded). Participants
were given the instruction “Take a moment and imagine that you are having your absolute worst
day at school. Imagine that you are asked to think the following thoughts about yourself. Rate
how uncomfortable it would be to think the thought by placing one mark on the line.” They
were then presented with a list of sentences such as “I am stupid” and “I am intelligent.” They
rated how uncomfortable the thoughts were on a visual analog scale, with Not At All
Uncomfortable at 0 mm on the scale and Very Uncomfortable at 100 mm on the scale. The six
negative stimuli with the highest ratings of discomfort (a disappointment, a failure, dumb,
inadequate, useless, unsuccessful) and the six positive stimuli with the lowest ratings of
discomfort (able, knowledgeable, capable, adequate, qualified, an achiever) were used in the
IRAP task.

Main Study
Participants. Participants were 99 undergraduate students at the University of
Mississippi, aged 18 years or older. They were recruited from the Psychology Department
subject pool. There were 69 female and 28 male participants. Sixty-eight were Caucasian, 22
African-American, 6 Asian, 1 Hispanic, and 1 self-identified as “other.” The mean age of
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participants was 20 years old (range = 18-44). Two participants failed to fill out demographic
information.
Measures.
Demographics. Demographic information was collected as part of the IRAP computer
task.

Psychological Flexibility: AAQ-II. The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II is a
scale designed to measure psychological flexibility. Psychological flexibility is defined in ACT
as “the process of contacting the present moment fully as a conscious human being and
persisting or changing behavior in the service of chosen values” (Hayes et al., 2006, p. 9). The
original 10-item version was used in this study, though more recent psychometric analysis has
produced a 7-item version. Items are answered on a 7-point Likert scale. Higher scores indicate
more psychological flexibility.
The AAQ-II has shown adequate psychometric properties (Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter,
Guenole, Orcutt, Waltz, & Zettle, in press). Test-retest reliability is reported as .81 at three
months and .79 at twelve months. Internal consistency is reported as .84. The AAQ-II predicts
outcomes consistent with theory, while also demonstrating discriminant validity.
General Psychological Distress: OQ-45. The Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45) was
used to evaluate equivalence of groups with respect to general psychological distress. It is a 45item questionnaire assessing psychological symptoms, interpersonal functioning, and social role
functioning. Items are answered on a 5-point Likert scale. Higher scores indicate higher levels
of distress, with scores ranging from 0 to 180. The OQ-45 has shown adequate reliability (test-
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retest = .78-.84; internal consistency = .93) and validity in college age samples (Lambert,
Hansen, Umpress, Lunnen, Okiishu, Burlingame, & Reisinger, 2001).
Academic Distress: LASSI Anxiety Scale. Attitudes and behaviors related to learning
and studying are assessed in the 77-question Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI),
which consists of ten scales. The 8-item Anxiety scale was used in this study to assess
equivalence of groups with respect to academic distress. The scale consists of items such as: “I
worry that I will flunk out of school,” which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale. Lower scores
indicate poorer functioning (higher academic anxiety). The LASSI has been found to be reliable
and valid for the evaluation of skills related to academic success in undergraduates (Weinstein,
et al., 1988; Weinstein & Palmer, 2002).
Discomfort/Believability/Willingness Rating Forms. Instructions remind the participant
of the thought being rated (“I’m a failure”). Participants rated each of the following by marking
a point on a visual analog scale (0 mm – 100 mm): (1) Discomfort: “How uncomfortable is the
thought?” (2) Believability: “How believable (true) is the thought?” (3) Willingness: “How
willing are you to have this thought?”
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The Implicit Relational Assessment
Procedure (IRAP) is a computer task which has been explored as a measure of implicit beliefs or
attitudes, from an RFT perspective (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, Hayden, Milne, &
Stewart, 2006; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). The IRAP is
somewhat similar in procedure to the more widely known Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In the IAT, it is assumed that participants respond
more quickly and accurately when required to associate stimuli in ways consistent with their
implicit attitudes.
14

The IRAP is based on a similar assumption. However, the IRAP allows examination of
specific relationships between stimuli. Relational terms (e.g., similar/opposite, better/worse,
true/false) can be used to test these specific relationships. (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; BarnesHolmes et al., 2010)
Quicker responses in relating stimuli during the IRAP are held to indicate consistency
with a participant’s verbal learning history. The IRAP requires participants to “respond quickly
and accurately in ways that are either consistent or inconsistent with their pre-experimentally
established verbal relations” (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006, p. 170). Mean response latencies are
compared between “consistent” and “inconsistent” trials.
The “IRAP effect” of quicker responding in consistent trials has been found in previous
studies, but the reliability and validity of the IRAP are not yet clear (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006;
Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). How these trials are presented in the IRAP is also still evolving
(Levin, Hayes, & Waltz, 2010).
For the purposes of this study, it was hypothesized that increased psychological
flexibility due to the defusion exercise would reduce any “IRAP effect.” In other words,
responding to consistent and inconsistent trials would become more similar as psychological
flexibility increased. Latency would decrease for inconsistent trials.
The IRAP for this study began by directing the participant to stimuli (words) that
appeared in two boxes at the top of a computer screen. Participants were instructed to read the
words together as a sentence (e.g., “I am capable”). Participants then responded to this sentence
by picking between two choices at the bottom of the screen (“true” or “false”).
For each trial, a category stimulus appeared at the top of the screen (“I am” or “I am
not”), a target stimulus just below (a disappointment, a failure, dumb, inadequate, useless,
15

unsuccessful, able, knowledgeable, capable, adequate, qualified, or an achiever), and two
relations at either side of the bottom of the screen from which the participant was to choose
(“true” and “false”). Choices were made by pressing the “e” or “i” key on the keyboard (see
example below).

I am
an achiever

press ‘e’ for
TRUE

press ‘i’ for
FALSE

Half of the trials were consistent with negative self-relevant thinking about academics. In
other words, the correct response in a trial would be “true” in response to “I am a failure,”
“false” in response to “I am an achiever,” and “true” in response to “I am not knowledgeable.”
The other half of the trials were inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about
academics. An incorrect selection produced a red “X” in the middle of the screen. The next trial
did not appear until the correct selection was made.
After a series of practice trials to ensure that the participant understood the task, the
experimental blocks began. Each block consisted of 24 trials. Three blocks of trials consistent
with negative self-relevant academic thinking and three blocks of trials inconsistent with
negative self-relevant academic thinking were randomly presented. The IRAP program recorded
latencies of correct responses.
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Procedure.
Pre-intervention. Participants completed the LASSI Anxiety scale and OQ-45.
Participants then completed the Academic Anxiety Mood Induction (see Appendix B) to focus
their attention on thoughts of academic distress. The exercise consisted of sixty statements on
separate sheets of paper that participants read at a pace of one per 15 seconds. The pace was
kept by following recorded instructions to move to the next statement. Statements were adapted
from Velten (1968) and were designed to begin with a neutral statement and subsequently
increase in anxiety. Examples of statements include item 1: “Today is neither better nor worse
than any other day,” item 30: “I feel so alone and scared about my academic future,” and item
60: “My life is so full of problems in school that make me worried that I can’t handle it. I feel
like I’ll explode with tension.” After reading the statements, subjects were instructed to
concentrate on their anxiety and feel it intensify while closing their eyes for 2 minutes. The
subjects completed the IRAP. Discomfort/Believability/Willingness Rating Forms were
completed immediately prior to the intervention.
Intervention. Participants signed up to do the study in groups of about fifteen in a
classroom. Six sessions were held and the condition used in each session was randomly
assigned, with two sessions for each condition. The experimenter presented each group of
participants with one of the following interventions. They were scripted and lasted
approximately the same amount of time (several minutes).
Defusion. The intervention began with a brief rationale for use of this technique with
problematic thoughts. This was demonstrated with the “Milk, Milk, Milk” repeated-word
exercise (Hayes et al., 1999, p. 154). Participants then practiced the repeated-word exercise with
academic distress content (e.g., “I’m a failure”) for 60 seconds. (see Appendix A)
17

Thought Control. The intervention began with a brief rationale for use of this technique
with problematic thoughts. Positive self-talk, breathing exercises, positive imagery, and thoughtstopping were demonstrated briefly. The experimenter then reminded the participants of the
academic distress content and instructed them to use these strategies to keep the thought away.
The task was timed for 60 seconds. (see Appendix A)
No Instruction/Distraction. The experimenter instructed the participants to read an article
on the ivory-billed woodpecker until she said, “stop.” The participants read the article for a time
equivalent to the other conditions.
Post-Intervention. Discomfort/Believability/Willingness Rating Forms were completed
immediately after the intervention. The participants then completed the IRAP a second time.
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III. RESULTS

Equivalence of groups
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference between groups in age, F (2, 94) =
.198, p = .821. Chi-square tests also revealed no significant differences between groups in
gender, χ2 (4, N = 99) = 1.457, p = .834, or in race, χ2 (10, N = 99) = 8.783, p = .553.
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, skew, kurtosis) were calculated for LASSI
Anxiety, AAQ-II, and OQ-45 separately for each condition (see tables 1, 2, and 3). The skew
and kurtosis were less than twice the standard error for each distribution, therefore adequate
normality was assumed for use of ANOVAs. One-way ANOVAs revealed that there were no
significant differences between conditions for the LASSI Anxiety scale scores, F (2, 98) = 1.119,
p = .331, AAQ-II scores, F (2, 98) = .977, p = .380, or OQ-45 scores, F (2, 98) = 1.487, p = .231.

Table 1
Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45) Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Thought Control

32

54.56

18.130

.223

-.517

Defusion Exercise

36

62.58

18.998

.204

-.228

Read Article

31

60.16

21.298

-.164

-.073
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Table 2
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Thought Control

32

50.41

9.196

-.457

-.910

Defusion Exercise

36

47.92

9.840

-.293

-1.031

Read Article

31

47.00

11.121

-.317

.451

Table 3
LASSI Anxiety Scale Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Thought Control

32

20.00

4.551

-.530

-1.095

Defusion Exercise

36

18.61

4.265

-.494

-.775

Read Article

31

19.81

3.609

-.032

.638

Discomfort
An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine whether the post-intervention
discomfort ratings for the thought control, defusion, and article conditions differed after
adjustments for differences in pre-intervention discomfort ratings. Table 4 provides a descriptive
summary of the pre- and post-intervention discomfort ratings, including the adjustments in the
post-intervention discomfort means after controlling for the influence of the pre-intervention
discomfort ratings. Visual analysis of unadjusted pre- and post-intervention mean discomfort
ratings is available in figure 1.
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Table 4
Discomfort Ratings Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Pre
Mean

Post
Mean

Adjusted
Post Meana

Adjusted Post
Std. Errora

Thought Control

32

62.94

46.78

49.67

5.20

Defusion Exercise

35

70.20

45.49

43.40

4.97

Read Article

30

68.10

65.70

65.05

5.36

Note. Adjustments based on pre discomfort = 67.15

Figure 1 . Unadjusted mean discomfort ratings for each condition:
Thought Control, Cognitive Defusion, and Reading an Article. Error bars at 95%
CI.
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The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2,
94) = 2.480, p = .089. A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention discomfort
ratings for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatterplot fitted with least squares
regression lines (Figure 2). The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention discomfort ratings and the intervention
condition, F (2, 91) = .477, p = .622.

Figure 2. Pre- and post-intervention discomfort ratings: data points and regression lines
per group.
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As indicated in the discomfort ANCOVA summary (Table 5), pre-intervention ratings
were significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 93) = 53.25, p = .000, partial η2 =
.364. After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention discomfort ratings, intervention
condition was found to have a significant effect on post-intervention discomfort ratings, F (2, 93)
= 4.57, p = .013, partial η2 = .089. Thus, the amount of decrease in discomfort ratings depended
on the condition.
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the defusion intervention resulted in post
discomfort ratings that were significantly lower than those in the article condition (mean
difference = -21.65, p = .012). Thus the defusion intervention reduced discomfort ratings
relative to the control condition. The difference between the post discomfort ratings in the
thought control and article conditions was not significant (mean difference = -15.38, p = .127),
nor was the difference between the defusion and the thought control conditions (mean difference
= -6.27, p = 1.00).

Table 5
Discomfort Ratings ANCOVA Results
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

Partial η2

Pre Discomfort

45845

1

45845

53.25

.000

.364

Condition

7870

2

3935

4.57

.013

.089

Error

80069

93

861

Believability
An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine whether the post-intervention
believability ratings for the thought control, defusion, and article conditions differed after
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adjustments for differences in pre-intervention believability ratings. Table 6 provides a
descriptive summary of the pre- and post-intervention believability ratings, including the
adjustments in the post-intervention believability means after controlling for the influence of the
pre-intervention believability ratings. Visual analysis of unadjusted pre- and post-intervention
mean believability ratings is available in figure 3.

Table 6
Believability Ratings Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Pre
Mean

Post
Mean

Adjusted
Post Meana

Adjusted Post
Std. Errora

Thought Control

32

26.63

14.31

16.13

3.42

Defusion Exercise

35

25.66

22.14

24.59

3.27

Read Article

30

36.77

33.43

28.63

3.56

Note. Adjustments based on pre believability = 29.41
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Figure 3 . Unadjusted mean believability ratings for each condition: Thought Control,
Cognitive Defusion, and Reading an article. Error bars at 95% CI.

The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2,
94) = 1.33, p = .268. A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention believabiliy
ratings for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatterplot fitted with least squares
regression lines (Figure 4). The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention believability ratings and the intervention
condition, F (2, 91) = 1.99, p = .142.
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Figure 4. Pre- and post-intervention believability ratings: data points and regression lines
per group.

As indicated in the believability ANCOVA summary (Table 7), pre-intervention ratings
were significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 93) = 101, p = .000, partial η2 =
.521. After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention believability ratings, intervention
condition was found to have a significant effect on post-intervention believability ratings, F(2,
93) = 3.37, p = .039, partial η2 = .068. Thus, the amount of decrease in believability ratings
depended on the condition.
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the thought control intervention resulted
in post believability ratings that were significantly lower than those in the article condition (mean
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difference = -12.50, p = .040). Thus the thought control intervention reduced believability
ratings significantly relative to the control condition. The difference between the post
believability ratings in the defusion and article conditions was not significant (mean difference =
-4.04, p = 1.00), nor was the difference between the thought control and the defusion conditions
(mean difference = -8.46, p = .23).

Table 7
Believability Ratings ANCOVA Results
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

Partial η2

Pre Believability

37776

1

37776

101

.000

.521

Condition

2520

2

1260

3.37

.039

.068

Error

34749

93

373

Willingness
An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine whether the post-intervention
willingness ratings for the thought control, defusion, and article conditions differed after
adjustments for differences in pre-intervention willingness ratings. Table 8 provides a
descriptive summary of the pre- and post-intervention willingness ratings, including the
adjustments in the post-intervention willingness means after controlling for the influence of the
pre-intervention willingness ratings. Visual analysis of unadjusted pre- and post-intervention
mean willingness ratings is available in figure 5.
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Table 8
Willingness Ratings Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Pre
Mean

Post
Mean

Adjusted
Post Meana

Adjusted Post
Std. Errora

Thought Control

32

21.97

14.44

14.59

2.96

Defusion Exercise

35

23.29

20.89

20.23

2.83

Read Article

30

21.23

24.60

25.20

3.06

Note. Adjustments based on pre willingness = 22.22

Figure 5 . Unadjusted mean willingness ratings for each condition: Thought Control,
Cognitive Defusion, and Reading an article. Error bars at 95% CI.
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The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2,
94) = 2.31, p = .105. A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention willingness
ratings for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatter plot fitted with least squares
regression lines (Figure 6). The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention willingness ratings and the intervention
condition, F (2, 91) = 1.91, p = .154.

Figure 6. Pre- and post-intervention willingness ratings: data points and regression lines
per group.

As indicated in the willingness ANCOVA summary (Table 9), pre-intervention ratings
were significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 93) = 79.22, p = .000, partial η2 =
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.460. After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention willingness ratings, intervention
condition was found to have a significant effect on post-intervention willingness ratings, F(2, 93)
= 3.12, p = .049, partial η2 = .063. Thus, the amount of decrease in willingness ratings depended
on the condition.
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that the thought control intervention resulted
in post willingness ratings that were significantly lower than those in the article condition (mean
difference = -10.61, p = .043). Thus the thought control intervention reduced willingness ratings
significantly relative to the control condition. The difference between the post willingness
ratings in the defusion and article conditions was not significant (mean difference = -4.97, p =
.71), nor was the difference between the thought control and the defusion conditions (mean
difference = -5.64, p = .52).

Table 9
Willingness Ratings ANCOVA Results
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

Partial η2

Pre Willingness

22194

1

22194

79.22

.000

.460

Condition

1749

2

875

3.12

.049

.063

Error

26056

93

280

IRAP
Transformation to DIRAP scores. The IRAP program records latency of correct
responses in milliseconds. The raw latency data are most often transformed into DIRAP scores for
analysis. Data from individuals with unusually slow or fast responding are eliminated and
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latency scores are divided by standard deviations. This is intended to reduce variance due to
individual differences such as age and cognitive ability and allow for better group comparisons.
These transformations involve distinguishing four different trial types in the IRAP. Trial
types in our IRAP are determined by the category stimulus (“I am” or “I am not”) and the type of
target stimulus—a positive academic word or a negative academic word (“an achiever” or “a
failure”). Trial types are “I am-positive,” “I am-negative,” “I am not-positive,” and “I am notnegative.” Either “true” or “false” is the correct response to each trial, determining whether the
trial is consistent or inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about academics.
Steps for transformation from raw latency to DIRAP scores are outlined by Barnes-Holmes
and colleagues (2010, p. 533):
(1) Only response-latency data from test blocks are used; (2) latencies
above 10,000 ms from the data set are eliminated; (3) all data for a participant are
removed if he or she produces more than 10% of test-block trials with latencies
less than 300 ms; (4) 12 standard deviations for the four trial types are computed:
four from the response latencies from Test Blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies
from Test Blocks 3 and 4, and a further four from Test Blocks 5 and 6; (5) 24
mean latencies for the four trial types in each test block are calculated; (6)
difference scores are calculated for each of the four trial types for each pair of test
blocks by subtracting the mean latency of the consistent block from the mean
latency of the corresponding inconsistent block; (7) each difference score is
divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding DIRAP
scores, one score for each trial type for each pair of test blocks; (8) four overall
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trial-type DIRAP scores, or IRAP effects, are calculated by averaging the scores for
each trial type across the three pairs of test blocks.
These four trial-type DIRAP scores were averaged for an overall DIRAP score that was used in our
analysis. Remember that ultimately, the DIRAP score indicates the difference in latency in
responding in ways that are consistent or inconsistent with negative self-relevant thinking about
academics.
IRAP Analysis (ANCOVA). An analysis of covariance was conducted to determine
whether the post-intervention DIRAP scores for the thought control, defusion, and article
conditions differed after adjustments for differences in pre-intervention DIRAP scores. Two
participants were eliminated from analysis as part of the DIRAP algorithm, due to very short
response latencies. A third was eliminated due to having a blank datasheet from the IRAP. Table
10 provides a descriptive summary of the pre- and post-intervention DIRAP scores, including the
adjustments in the post-intervention DIRAP means after controlling for the influence of the preintervention DIRAP scores.

Table 10
DIRAP Descriptive Statistics
Condition

N

Pre
Mean

Post
Mean

Adjusted
Post Meana

Adjusted Post
Std. Errora

Thought Control

30

.319

.298

.287

.049

Defusion Exercise

35

.269

.262

.276

.045

Read Article

30

.309

.209

.203

.048

Note. Adjustments based on Pre DIRAP = .297
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The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed with the Levene test, F (2,
92) = .260, p = .772. A linear relationship between the pre- and post-intervention DIRAP scores
for all groups was confirmed by graphic analysis of a scatterplot fitted with least squares
regression lines (Figure 7). The assumption of equal regression slopes was supported by finding
no significant interaction between the pre-intervention DIRAP scores and the intervention
condition, F (2, 89) = .886, p = .416.
As indicated in the IRAP ANCOVA summary (Table 11), pre-intervention scores were
significantly related to the post-intervention scores, F (1, 91) = 29.43, p = .000, partial η2 = .244.
After adjusting the group means for the pre-intervention DIRAP scores, intervention condition was
found to have a non-significant effect on post-intervention DIRAP scores, F (2, 91) = .906, p =
.408, partial η2 = .020. Thus the IRAP did not indicate an increase in psychological flexibility
due to any intervention condition.
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Figure 7. Pre- and post-intervention DIRAP scores: data points and regression lines per
group.

Table 11
DIRAP ANCOVA Results
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

Pre DIRAP

2.073

1

2.073

29.43

.000

Condition

.128

2

.064

.906

.408

Error

6.412

91

.070
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Partial η2

IV. DISCUSSION

The effect of a specific cognitive defusion exercise, with specific distressing thought
content, was examined in the present study. A word repetition defusion intervention was
compared with a thought control intervention. A distraction task (reading an article) was used as
an experimental control condition. The thought content used in the exercises reflected academic
distress. Participants were undergraduate students who were primed to feel anxious about
academic failure. The statement “I am a failure” was rated for discomfort, believability, and
willingness pre- and post-intervention.
No significant differences were found for post-intervention ratings (discomfort,
believability, willingness) between the defusion and thought control interventions. The defusion
exercise did result in significantly lower ratings of discomfort than the control condition. The
thought control exercise did result in significantly lower ratings of believability than the control
condition. Willingness ratings were expected to increase in the defusion condition, but they did
not. Willingness ratings decreased significantly in the thought control condition relative to the
distraction condition.
The IRAP was also administered pre- and post-intervention to assess any change in
psychological flexibility. It was hoped that the IRAP would serve as a behavioral measure of
defusion, to add to the self-report ratings of discomfort, believability, and willingness. The
IRAP compared response latency to tasks consistent and inconsistent with negative self-relevant
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thinking about academics. No significant effect was found between conditions for the IRAP,
indicating no difference in effect on psychological flexibility.
The lack of difference on outcome measures following defusion and thought control
conditions is unexpected given Masuda and colleagues’ (2004, 2010) previous findings of
defusion’s superiority in similar comparisons. The protocol used in the interventions in this
study was modeled after their initial investigation (Masuda et al., 2004), but there were some
differences. These previous studies had participants produce their own negative self-referential
statements and then reduce these to one word for use in the defusion exercise. This study, in
contrast, used a short sentence (I am a failure) for every participant in the repeated-word
defusion exercise. Masuda and colleagues’ (2004) initial study comparing defusion to thought
control was a small time-series study, where the interventions were administered individually.
However, the more recent study (Masuda et al., 2010) was delivered in a group format just as the
present study.
Willingness ratings were not taken in the studies discussed above, but were found to
increase as a result of defused presentations of negative self-statements by Healy and colleagues
(2008). This was a different defusion task than used in the present study, with 10 different
negative self-statements presented visually. Those differences could account for this study’s
finding of word repetition’s lack of effect on willingness ratings.
One limitation of this study, which was identified by Masuda and colleagues (2010) with
a similar protocol, is that the thought control task was less structured during the 30 second
intervention period than the defusion exercise. In the defusion exercise, participants were
repeating thought content out loud throughout the 30 seconds. In the thought control task,
participants were instructed not to think of the thought content and were only reminded of this
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once in the 30 second period. How exactly participants were responding to their own thoughts
during this time was likely to have been more varied than in the defusion condition.
Masuda and colleagues (2010) also point out that the differences in process between
defusion exercises and thought control/distraction exercises have not yet been clearly delineated.
It is possible that similar processes are occurring in both interventions. Masuda and colleagues’
(2010) study found that thought distraction had significant effects compared to the control
condition.
Masuda and colleagues (2010) suggest that the believability measure might not have been
sensitive enough to detect some changes due to defusion in their study. They suggest that
instead of “how believable (true) is the thought?” better alternatives could be “how much do you
experience the thought simply as a mental event, rather than as an absolute fact about you?” or
“how OK is it for you to have this thought?” They suggest that these questions might better
detect changes due to the process of defusion. This could also be the case in the present study.
Masuda and colleagues (2010) noted their reliance on self-report measures alone as a
limitation of their study. The present study attempted to address this with the inclusion of the
IRAP. However, the IRAP has its own limitations, yet lacking evidence of reliability or validity.
It is not clear if the IRAP would have measured any potential changes due to the defusion
exercise. Methods to directly assess defusion processes would further research in this area.
Unfortunately such methods have yet to be developed.
It is possible that the present study did not find the expected effect of defusion due to the
characteristics of the population. Participants were undergraduate students, and though they
were exposed to a procedure intended to induce academic anxiety, it could be that academic
concerns were not particularly relevant for a portion of the sample. The phrase “I am a failure,”
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following the academic anxiety induction exercise, might not have been very meaningful for
some of the participants. A sample of individuals on academic probation could be used in future
studies to address this concern. Or participants could be screened for academic distress prior to
inclusion. It is also possible that the word repetition defusion exercise is an effective technique,
but not in every population or with every psychological difficulty.
Future studies could vary the dose and timing of the intervention, perhaps exposing
participants to the intervention at several time points. This would be more similar to the way that
defusion exercises are used in clinical situations. In treatment, exercises are often repeated or
several defusion exercises are used within a therapy session, with treatment spread over weeks.
Future studies should address these limitations and examine the repeated-word defusion
technique, as well as other defusion exercises, in other contexts. These techniques would
ultimately be used as part of clinical interventions, so it would make sense to focus studies on
samples with specific clinical difficulties. Improvement in measuring the process of defusion
would aid tremendously in research investigating defusion as a mediator or mechanism in ACT.
Careful examination of components of ACT as a treatment should help in its development as an
empirically based intervention. Defusion as a process in ACT cannot be assumed to be an active
ingredient without ongoing empirical investigation.
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ACT Defusion
Experimenter (E): As a species, language, including thoughts and words, gives us
the blessings and the curse of knowledge. The power of language has pros and
cons: there is a "light side" and a "dark side". On the positive side, we can
influence the environment and create a comfortable life. Just look around in
this room. Lights, chairs, central heating, and clothes we are wearing…
Without language and our thoughts (e.g., logical thinking), these would not be
here. On the dark side, however, we are the only species that worries. In the
extreme case, we are the only species that commits suicide.
The dark side becomes dominant when we believe that our thoughts are
literally what they say they are, especially thoughts about ourselves that could
be evaluative and judgmental. For example, "I am no good." And we tend to
think of our thoughts, of what they say, as the reality or as the criteria of the
reality. For example, you are what your thoughts say who you are, what you
are, and how you are. However, are you really what your thoughts say you are?
What if I say that thoughts are simply what they are (thoughts are just
thoughts), rather than what they say they are. OR you are not what they say
you are. It might be difficult to get this point, so let's do a little exercise.
As I say, this exercise sounds silly. I'm going to ask you to say a word. Then
you tell me what comes to mind. I want you to say the word, "Milk".
Participant (P): Milk.
E: Good. Now tell me what comes to mind when you said it?
P: (I have milk at home in the refrigerator).
E: O.K. what else? What shows up when we say "Milk".
P: (I picture it---white, a glass).
E: Good what else? (Can you taste it?). Can you feel what it feels like to drink a
glass of milk? Cold, creamy, coats your mouth…right?
E: O.K. let's see if this fits. What came across your mind were things about actual
milk and your experience with it. All that happened is that we made a strange
sound — Milk (say it slowly!) --- and lots of those things show up. Notice that
there isn't any milk in this room, not at all. But milk was in the room
psychologically. You and I were seeing it, tasting it, and feeling it. And yet,
only the word was actually here.
E: Now, here is another exercise. The exercise is a little silly, and you might feel
embarrassed doing it, but I am going to do it with you so we can all be silly
together. What I am going to ask you to do is to say the word, "milk," out loud,
over-and-over again, and as rapidly as possible, and then notice what happens.
Are you ready?
E: O.K., Let's do it. Say "milk" over and over again!
(20 seconds).
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E: O.K. now stop. Tell me what came to mind while you kept repeating it?
P: (e.g., Gone, it sounds funny, it was just a sound)
E: Did you notice what happened to the psychological aspects of milk that were
here a few minutes ago?
P:
E: Right, a creamy, cold, gluggy stuff just goes away. When you said it the first
time, it was as if milk was actually here, in the room. But all that really
happened was that you just said that word. The first time you said it, it was
"psychologically" meaning-full, and it was almost solid. But when you said it
again and again and again, you began to loose that meaning and the words
became just a sound.
E: What I am suggesting is that… What happens in this exercise may be applied
to our personal thoughts about ourselves. When you say things to yourself in
addition to any meaning behind those words, isn't it also true that these
thoughts are just thoughts. The thoughts are just smoke, there isn't anything
solid in them.

E: Now, your task here is to say the thought "XXX ," out loud, over and over
again, as rapidly as possible until I say "stop". Do you have any questions?
P: (the participant may or may not ask questions about the procedure)
E:O. K., are you ready? Now, begin (Experimenter may repeat the thought with
the participants initially to prompt them to follow the protocol).
(60 seconds)
E: Stop!
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Thought Control
Experimenter (E): It is often conceptualized that the core of our emotional and
psychological suffering is caused by our negative thoughts, such as negative
thoughts about the situation, oneself, and the future. From this perspective,
these thoughts are considered to affect our subsequent actions.
This notion has been supported culturally in our society. We can see this
attribution of cause in our daily lives. For example, "I cannot ask her out,
because (I think) I'm not attractive enough." "(I think) I am stupid and that
thought makes me feel miserable." We have a tendency to believe that our
thoughts are the reason or cause of our actions.
One way to prevent this pattern is to remove or control your negative
thoughts. Controlling them by distracting yourself, thinking something
different, or suppressing them, trying to get rid of them.
When you think something negative, You will tell yourself, "Stop! Stop
thinking about it." What are your strategies to deal with your negative thoughts
when they appear in mind?
Participant (P):
E: O.K., Good. What else?
P:
E: O.K., so now let's review what psychotherapy literatures say about controlling
thoughts and feelings. In psychotherapy, there are several techniques to control
your thoughts and feelings so that you don't have to feel as much discomfort.
These are 1) positive self-talk, 2) breathing training, and 3) positive imagery.
In positive self-talk, you say something positive to yourself whenever you have
a negative thought. Can you tell me some positive thoughts?
P:
E: Good, now for breathing training, I want you to put your hand on your
stomach, and do as I say. I want you to breath slowly, inhaling the air from
your nose, and hold it for a while, and exhale it from the mouth slowly.
E: Positive imagery is similar to positive self-talk, you simply visualize something
positive in your mind, such as a beautiful beach, calm lake, and so on. All of
these techniques are designed to remove your uncomfortable thoughts.
E: Now let's do a little exercise. I want you to say "XXX.” Say it once now.
Participant (P): XXX
E: O.K. Your task is to NOT think of the words, "XXX". You must try hard not to
think "XXX" until I say, "STOP". If you have any questions, please ask me
now.
P: (the participant may or may not ask questions about the procedure)
E: Are you ready? Now, begin (The experimenter will say "Don’t' think of XXX "
once in the 30th second of the session).
(60 seconds)
E: Stop!
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No Instruction Condition (reading an article)

Experimenter (E): Please read this article until I say "Stop". If you have questions, please
ask me now.
(5 minutes)
Experimenter (E): O.K., Stop. Remember the thought “XXX.” I would like you say it
once.
Participant (P): XXX
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Appendix B: Measures
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PRE: Discomfort, Believability, & Willingness Rating Form

“I am a failure.”

1). How uncomfortable is the thought? Please mark (√) on the dashed line.
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Not at all Uncomfortable

Very Uncomfortable

2). How believable (true) is the thought?
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Not at all Believable

Very Believable

3). How willing are you to have this thought?
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Not at all Willing

Very Willing
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POST: Discomfort, Believability, & Willingness Rating Form

“I am a failure.”

1). How uncomfortable is the thought? Please mark (√) on the dashed line.
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Not at all Uncomfortable

Very Uncomfortable

2). How believable (true) is the thought?
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Not at all Believable

Very Believable

3). How willing are you to have this thought?
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Not at all Willing

Very Willing
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LASSI Anxiety Scale (all items except #5 are reverse scored; higher score = less anxiety)
Rate how much the statement is typical of you:

1. I worry that I will flunk out of school.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

2. I get discouraged because of low grades.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

3. I am very tense when I study.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

4. Even when I am well prepared for a test, I feel very anxious.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

5. When I begin an examination, I feel pretty confident that I will do well.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

6. Worrying about doing poorly interferes with my concentration on tests.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

7. I feel very panicky when I take an important test.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much

8. I get so nervous and confused when taking an examination that I fail to answer
questions to the best of my ability.
1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5
not at all
not very
somewhat
fairly
very much
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AAQ-2
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a
number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

never
true

very
seldom
true

seldom
true

sometimes
true

frequently
true

almost
always true

always
true

1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. My painful experiences and memories make it
difficult for me to live a life that I would value.
(Reverse)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. I’m afraid of my feelings. (Reverse)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. I worry about not being able to control my worries
and feelings. (Reverse)
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a
fulfilling life. (Reverse)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. I am in control of my life.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. Emotions cause problems in my life. (Reverse)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. It seems like most people are handling their lives
better than I am. (Reverse)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. Worries get in the way of my success. (Reverse)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of
how I want to live my life.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Demographic Information

Age (in years):

_______

For the remaining items, please circle your answers—circle only one answer per
question.

Country of Origin (where you have lived the majority of your life):
1

2

United States

Other

Education (choose your current level of education):
1

2

freshman

3

sophomore

4

junior

senior 5graduate

Political Affiliation (select the party that you most identify with):
1

2

Democrat

Republican

3

Other

Race (select the ethnicity that you most identify with):
1

2

African-American

Asian

3

Caucasian

4

Hispanic

5

Other

Religion (select the category that you most identify with):
1

2

Agnostic

Atheist

3

Buddhist

4

Christian

5

Hindu

6

Jewish

7

Muslim

8

Other

Sex:
1

Female

2

Male

Socioeconomic Status (if someone other than you is providing more than 50% of your
income, please report his or her annual income instead):
1

$10,000 or less
5
$60,000 or more

2

$10,001-$20,000

3

$20,001-$40,000
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4

$40,001-$60,000

Academic Anxiety Mood Induction
Oral instructions:
“You will read self referent, mood related statements at the rate of one per 15 seconds.
Concentrate on the mood associated with each statement and think of things in your own
life that reflects the mood represented by each statement. After you have read 60
statements, you will read a set of incubation instructions designed to build the mood even
more. After that, you will sit for 2 minutes while concentrating on building the mood. If
the task becomes too uncomfortable, raise your hand, and the experimenter will excuse
you from the task.”
Academic Anxiety Statements
1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day.
2. I’m an incredibly anxious person when it comes to academics.
3. I’m haunted with thoughts about myself and how I come across to others in
classes.
4. I feel distressed by thoughts about college that disturb me.
5. I’m worried that the potential for failing may get a lot worse.
6. School makes me fret with concern in general.
7. I feel needled and badgered with racing thoughts about grades.
8. It takes too much effort to try to relax—I feel too agitated to study.
9. I think about the same aggravating worries about school day after day.
10. I’m afraid that the potential for me to fail may get a lot worse. I’m afraid for my
future.
11. I’m edgy and very worried about grades.
12. My mind is troubled and harried by all the schoolwork I have to do.
13. I feel incredibly vexed and concerned about academics today.
14. I wish I could stop thinking about things like failing that make my blood run cold.
15. My mind is sometimes racing about school—I couldn’t relax if I wanted to.
16. I can’t communicate because I’m too confused in my mind about my academic
future.
17. I’m plagued by my racing mind, with thoughts about college.
18. There have been days when I felt unnerved and anxious and unable to do any
schoolwork.
19. It seems like my body may start to shake and tremble during tests.
20. I feel like I’m on pins and needles thinking about school.
21. Even when I try to relax—I’m always worried about school.
22. I feel hounded by my own thoughts about school.
23. I have too many concerns about my classes—I don’t know what to do.
24. I’m so tense that I’m having trouble remembering things for tests.
25. It’s so frightening, how tense I feel when I try to study.
26. I have the feeling that I will never calm down enough to succeed in college.
27. My mind is racing with all the concerns and problems about school that make me
anxious.
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28. I’ve lain awake at night worrying about never succeeding in school.
29. There have been days that I have worried so much about failing that I seemed to
do little else.
30. I feel so alone and scared about my academic future.
31. I’m much more anxious about grades than when I was younger—I seem to be
getting worse.
32. Too often I have found myself filled with a sense of dread, thinking worrisome
thoughts when I definitely should have been studying.
33. My mind is troubled and full of dread about my future.
34. I’m beginning to feel so uptight that I’m getting more and more worried thoughts
about school.
35. I’m horribly concerned about my family knowing how much I’m struggling in
college.
36. All of my academic fears and nightmares seem to be taking possession of me.
37. It has occurred to me more than once that studying is basically useless because I
feel too restless and agitated to concentrate.
38. I’m an incredibly uptight person when it comes to schoolwork.
39. I’m terribly tense and annoyed by my thoughts—I can’t study.
40. I’m so worried that I can’t concentrate on anything.
41. I worry so much about failing that I can’t stand it.
42. I’m getting nervous and anxious about my studies, I can feel the muscles in my
body getting more and more tense.
43. I’m too scared—I don’t know what to do about school.
44. When I feel this anxious about school, I fear that I may have a heart attack. My
health may not be as good as it’s supposed to be.
45. Every now and then I feel so worried that I can’t sit still or get any school work
accomplished.
46. I can’t think of anything except my worries about failing.
47. I couldn’t relax or calm down now if I had to.
48. At times I’ve been so fearful and scared that I ran away from academic problems
rather than face them.
49. No matter how hard I try, I can’t stop this feeling of panic and doom about my
future.
50. I’ve lain awake nights unable to sleep because I’m so terrified about school.
51. It feels like I may start trembling like a leaf—I’m unable to work on the things I
know I must get done.
52. I can’t stop worrying—my whole life makes me feel like I’m going to burst.
53. I’m so scared about my future that I feel like my hair is standing on end.
54. Sometimes I feel like I might have a panic attack.
55. I’m so afraid—my academic struggles make me feel tense and worried. I feel like
I have no control.
56. A sense of foreboding and dread fills me with fear that I will fail.
57. At times I’ve been so worried that I’ve had trouble sleeping and facing going to
class.
58. My life is so full of things to do for classes that fill me with dread that I can’t
stand it.
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59. I feel paralyzed with fear—some very important decisions about my future are
almost impossible to make.
60. My life is so full of problems in school that make me worried that I can’t handle
it. I feel like I’ll explode with tension.

Incubation Instructions
Now that you’re feeling very anxious about school, concentrate on this feeling. Feel it
getting stronger and stronger; more and more worried. Let it continue to build. Think
about things that have happened in your academic life that have made you feel very, very
anxious; like an upcoming exam, or telling your parents that you are doing poorly, or like
being frightened about your future. Concentrate on it. Let yourself feel very jittery,
worried, very anxious, very terrified. As you do, you’ll feel the mood build. It’ll become
more intense, more anxious. This in turn will make you think of other things about
college that have made you feel very, very anxious. The mood will continue to build. Feel
it become more intense. Feel it get stronger and stronger. It will happen. Do and think
whatever you can to build this very anxious mood. Feel very, very anxious about your
academic future. Close your eyes. Begin now. (2 minutes)
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